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Background	  	  
•  Increasing	  Demand	  of	  UAS	  operaAons	  in	  Civil	  Airspace	  and	  UAS	  
operaAons	  are	  currently	  very	  restricAve	  to	  operate	  in	  the	  NAS	  
–  The	  FAA	  believes	  that	  there	  may	  be	  as	  many	  as	  30,000	  unmanned	  aircraT	  
ﬂying	  in	  the	  NAS	  by	  as	  early	  as	  2025.	  
•  AccommodaAng	  UAS	  operaAons	  will	  cause	  increasing	  complexity	  
of	  the	  NAS	  and	  changing	  the	  roles	  and	  responsibiliAes	  of	  ATC	  
•  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  research	  eﬀorts	  is	  to	  improve	  safety	  
and	  reducing	  technical	  barriers	  and	  operaAonal	  challenges	  
associated	  with	  ﬂying	  unmanned	  aircraT	  in	  airspace	  shared	  by	  
commercial	  and	  civil	  air	  traﬃc.	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Some	  of	  Challenges	  to	  Integrate	  UAS	  into	  the	  NAS	  
•  Ensuring	  separaAon	  assurance	  	  
•  Ensuring	  adequate	  collision	  avoidance	  
•  Ensuring	  robust	  and	  secure	  communicaAons	  technologies	  
•  Solving	  the	  constraints	  of	  frequency	  spectrum	  allocaAon	  
•  Designing	  and	  evaluaAng	  ground	  control	  staAon	  displays	  	  
•  Deﬁning	  airworthiness	  and	  operaAonal	  standards	  
•  Deﬁning	  pilot	  cerAﬁcaAons	  requirements	  
•  Developing	  cerAﬁcaAon	  standards	  for	  automated	  systems	  
•  Deﬁning	  appropriate	  level	  of	  safety	  through	  systemaAc	  safety	  analysis	  
•  Developing	  cerAﬁcaAon	  standards	  for	  a	  wide	  range	  and/or	  type	  of	  UAS	  
•  Developing	  integrated	  soluAons	  for	  oﬀ-­‐nominal	  operaAons	  
•  Deﬁning	  operaAonal	  requirements	  for	  current	  and	  future	  missions	  sets	  
•  DeﬁniAons	  of	  roles	  and	  responsibiliAes	  between	  pilots	  and	  controllers	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Primary Research Objectives 
•  Develop	  and	  evaluate	  concepts	  of	  operaAons,	  procedures,	  
regulaAons,	  and	  advanced	  technologies	  to	  support	  safe	  and	  
eﬃcient	  UAS	  operaAons	  in	  the	  NAS	  
	  
•  InvesAgate	  how	  the	  integraAon	  of	  UAS	  into	  the	  current	  ground-­‐
based	  ATM	  system	  operaAons	  aﬀect	  safety,	  capacity	  and	  eﬃciency	  
of	  the	  NAS	  	  
–  Evaluate	  the	  impacts	  of	  UAS	  operaAons	  (wide	  range	  of	  UAS	  missions	  and	  
vehicle	  performance	  characterisAcs)	  on	  the	  NAS	  
	  
•  Assess	  the	  acceptability	  of	  the	  concepts	  and	  to	  evaluate	  the	  
eﬀecAveness	  of	  the	  associated	  technologies	  and	  procedures	  
through	  fast-­‐Ame,	  human-­‐in-­‐the-­‐loop	  simulaAons,	  and	  ﬁeld	  tests	  
	  
•  Support	  FAA	  and	  RTCA	  SC-­‐228	  to	  develop	  the	  minimum	  operaAonal	  
performance	  standards	  (MOPS)	  for	  UAS	  Detect-­‐And-­‐Avoid	  (DAA)	  
systems	  and	  traﬃc	  displays	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Unmanned	  AircraT	  System	  (UAS)	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Beyond line-of-sight link 
Air traffic services 
(TRACONs) 
Air traffic controller interaction 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the  
National Airspace System (NAS) 
LEGEND 
         Detect and Avoid (DAA Technologies) 
         Air Traffic Services 
         Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) Network 
         Legacy Command and Control (C2) Links 
 
ACRONYMS 
ADS–B: Automatic Dependent Surveillance—Broadcast 
DAA: Detect and Avoid 
TCAS–II: Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
TRACON – Terminal Radar Approach Control Facilities  
Video	  Clip	  for	  IntegraAng	  UAS	  into	  the	  NAS	  
8	  Source:	  haps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7hBcugTsWRQ	  
Separation Assurance in the NAS 
•  To	  ensure	  safe	  separaAon	  between	  two	  or	  more	  aircraT	  ﬂying	  
under	  IFR	  
•  To	  ensure	  avoidance	  of	  bad	  weather,	  special	  use	  of	  airspace,	  
terrain,	  or	  other	  hazards	  
•  ATC	  separaAon	  standards	  (typically	  in	  Class	  A	  airspace):	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(up to 3~5min) Strategic Separation 
Assurance/Management  
(up to 15~20min to LOS) 
Airspace	  SeparaAon	  Assurance	  for	  UAS	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•  FAA	  Regulatory	  requirements	  (14CFR	  Part	  91,	  §91.111	  and	  §91.113)	  to	  “see	  
and	  avoid”	  and	  to	  remain	  “well	  clear”	  of	  other	  aircraT.	  
•  UAS	  will	  be	  required	  to	  equip	  with	  a	  new	  system	  in	  order	  to	  fulﬁll	  the	  
regulatory	  requirement	  “see	  and	  avoid”	  to	  maintain	  a	  safe	  separaAon	  from	  




0	  sec	  ….…….…35	  sec…….……….~2	  min	  
Sense	  and	  Avoid	  
(Detect	  and	  Avoid)	  
Separa'on	  Assurance	  
…………………………………………………………………………………	  
ATC Provided Separation Assurance (SA)   UAS Detect-And-Avoid 
UAS	  Detect-­‐And-­‐Avoid	  (DAA)	  System	  
•  DAA	  is	  deﬁned	  as	  “the	  capability	  of	  a	  UAS	  to	  remain	  well	  clear	  
from,	  and	  avoid	  collisions	  with,	  other	  airborne	  traﬃc.	  DAA	  
provides	  the	  intended	  funcAons	  of	  self	  separaAon	  and	  collision	  
avoidance	  compaAble	  with	  expected	  behavior	  of	  aircraT	  
operaAng	  in	  the	  NAS.”	  	  
–  Self-­‐SeparaAon	  FuncAon,	  which	  keeps	  the	  aircraT	  “well	  clear”	  of	  other	  
airborne	  traﬃc;	  	  
–  Collision	  Avoidance	  FuncAon,	  which	  avoids	  near-­‐mid	  air	  collisions	  (NMAC)	  
•  DAA	  system	  will	  replace	  the	  “see-­‐and-­‐avoid”	  funcAon	  provided	  
by	  pilots	  in	  manned	  aircraT,	  which	  is	  an	  important	  contributor	  to	  
today’s	  safe	  air	  traﬃc	  operaAons.	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Concept	  of	  Well	  Clear	  SeparaAon	  Standard	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•  Airborne	  separaAon	  standard	  for	  DAA	  Self-­‐SeparaAon	  system	  
•  A	  well	  clear	  separaAon	  standard	  should	  be	  large	  enough	  to	  
–  Avoid	  collision	  avoidance	  maneuvers	  by	  intruders,	  	  
–  Minimize	  traﬃc	  alert	  issuances	  by	  air	  traﬃc	  control,	  
•  Time	  and	  distance-­‐based	  deﬁniAon	  of	  “Loss	  of	  Well	  Clear	  (LoWC)”	  	  	  
–  When	  two	  aircraT	  are	  within	  distance	  thresholds	  
–  When	  the	  projected	  horizontal	  range	  at	  closest	  point	  of	  approach	  (CPA)	  of	  two	  




“Well	  Clear”	  Distance	  Thresholds	  
Modiﬁed	  Tau	  
“Well	  Clear”	  Time	  Thresholds	  
Horizontal	  threshold	  at	  CPA	  
DeﬁniAon	  of	  Well	  Clear	  (RTCA	  Special	  Commiaee)	  
Parameters	   Values	   Descrip'ons	  
Modiﬁed	  Tau*	   35	  sec	   RaAo	  of	  range	  to	  range	  rate	  with	  DMOD	  
DMOD	   4,000	  T	   Distance	  modiﬁcaAon	  that	  represents	  a	  minimum	  desirable	  range	  
between	  two	  aircraT	  
HMD*	   4,000	  T	   Horizontal	  distance	  at	  the	  predicted	  horizontal	  CPA	  
ZTHR	   450	  T	   VerAcal	  separaAon	  threshold	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[0 ≤ τmod ≤ τ *mod and HMD ≤ HMD*] and [−ZTHR* ≤ dz ≤ ZTHR*]




for  Rxy > DMOD







Self-­‐SeparaAon	  AlerAng	  Threshold	  
•  Self-­‐separaAon	  declare	  threshold	  (SST),	  at	  which	  the	  DAA	  Self-­‐
SeparaAon	  (SS)	  funcAon	  declares	  that	  an	  acAon	  is	  needed	  to	  
preclude	  a	  threat	  aircraT	  from	  causing	  a	  well	  clear	  violaAon.	  	  
•  Several	  ways	  of	  deﬁning	  SST	  as	  alerAng	  criteria	  (zone)	  
–  Time-­‐based	  alerAng	  threshold	  parameters	  
•  Time	  to	  Loss	  of	  Well	  Clear	  (LoWC)	  	  
•  Time	  to	  Predicted	  Closest	  Point	  of	  Approach	  
–  Distance-­‐based	  alerAng	  threshold	  parameters	  
•  DMOD,	  HMD*,	  ZTHR*	  
•  Meaningful	  DAA	  performance	  must	  alert	  the	  UAS	  pilot	  to	  
potenAal	  threats	  at	  ranges	  suﬃcient	  for	  reacAon	  Ame	  and	  
avoidance	  acAons	  by	  safe	  margins	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Self-­‐SeparaAon	  AlerAng	  Threshold	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AlerAng	  and	  ResoluAon	  Performance	  of	  DAA	  System	  
•  The	  performance	  of	  DAA	  system	  will	  be	  dependent	  upon	  how	  
SST	  is	  deﬁned	  and	  how	  the	  values	  of	  the	  alerAng	  threshold	  
parameters	  are	  set	  
–  Large	  alerAng	  zone:	  excessive	  number	  of	  nuisance	  alerts	  	  
–  Small	  alerAng	  zone:	  not	  be	  able	  to	  avoid	  LoWC	  within	  a	  short	  period	  of	  
Ame	  
•  InvesAgaAon	  of	  the	  eﬀects	  of	  diﬀerent	  alerAng	  thresholds	  on	  the	  
safety	  and	  performance	  of	  DAA	  system	  	  
–  Number	  of	  LoWC	  (Success	  Rate)	  
–  Probability	  of	  correct	  alerts,	  nuisance	  alerts,	  late	  alerts	  and	  missed	  alerts	  
–  Actual	  Ame	  to	  LoWC	  given	  correct	  alerts	  
–  Etc.	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ACES:	  Flight	  plan	  and	  NAS-­‐agent	  
modeling	  system	  Traﬃc	  displays,	  DAA	  algorithms,	  ATC,	  Ground	  Control	  StaAon	  
Human-­‐in-­‐the-­‐Loop	  and	  Flight	  Test	  Evalua'on	  
NAS-­‐wide	  Simula'on	  
17	  UAV	  types	  
UAS	  models,	  
	  comm.	  link	  models	  18	  UAS	  mission	  proﬁles	   DAA	  algorithms	  
New	  UAS-­‐related	  modeling	  and	  simulaAon	  capabiliAes	  
DAA	  sensor	  models	  
Fast-­‐Time	  SimulaAon	  Environment	  
4-DOF Trajectory Model 
 Aerodynamic models of aircraft  
 User-definable uncertainty characteristics 
NAS-­‐wide	  Simula'on	  
•  Gate-­‐to-­‐gate	  simula'on	  of	  
ATM	  opera'ons	  	  	  
•  Full	  ﬂight	  schedule	  with	  
ﬂight	  plans	  
•  Sector	  and	  center	  models	  
with	  some	  airspace	  
procedures	  
Simula'on	  Agents	  
•  Air	  traﬃc	  controller	  decision	  making	  
•  Traﬃc	  ﬂow	  management	  models	  
•  Individual	  aircraZ	  characteris'cs	  
•  UAS	  Detect	  and	  Avoid	  algorithms	  
•  UAS	  pilot	  response	  model	  





Airport	  and	  Surface	  
Traﬃc	  Management	  
Airspace	  Concepts	  Evalua'on	  System	  (ACES)	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Overview	  of	  UAS	  Missions	  






1 Aerial$Imaging$and$Mapping 295 182.60
2 Air$Qualtiy$Monitoring 1044 2393.49
3 OnJDemand$Air$Taxi$Cirrus 8720 6240.12
4 OnJDemand$Air$Taxi$Mustang 3180 1107.76
5 Airborne$Pathogen$Tracking 1308 3002.24
6 Border$Patrol 867 3357.90
7 Cargo$Delivery 1317 1966.07
8 Flood$Inund.$Mapping 127 275.02
9 Flood$Stream$Flow 200 368.51
10 Law$Enforcement 300 859.11
11 Maritime$Patrol 1512 11267.74
12 Point$Source$Emission$Monitoring 432 648.05
13 Spill$Monitoring 836 2078.07
14 Strategic$Fire$Monitoring 312 4959.85
15 Tactical$Fire$Monitoring 2496 3373.88
16 Traffic$Monitoring 1043 1953.05
17 Weather$Data$Collection 2401 13324.86




UAV	  group	   Dura'on	  
(per	  ﬂight)	  
Flights	  per	  day	   Cruise	  Alt.	  	   Flight	  Pa[ern	  
Air	  Quality	  Monitoring	  	   Shadow-­‐B	  	   1-­‐4	  hrs.	   104-­‐1044	   4k,5k,	  and	  6k	  	  
T	  AGL	  
Radiator	  Grid	  Paaern	  
Cargo	  Transport	  
	  
Cessna	  208	  	  
	  
varies	   1.4k	   2k-­‐16k	   Point	  to	  Point	  
Atmospheric	  Sampling	   Global	  Hawk	   1.5-­‐13	  hrs.	   2352	   5k-­‐35k	  T	  AGL	   Radiator	  Grid	  Paaern	  
On-­‐demand	  Remote	  Air	  
Taxi	  -­‐Cirrus	  
	  
Cirrus	  SR22T	   varies	   8k	   6k-­‐11k	   Point	  to	  Point	  
On-­‐demand	  Remote	  Air	  




varies	   2k-­‐4k	   9k-­‐20k	   Point	  to	  Point	  
	  
Strategic	  	  Fire	  Monitoring	  
	  
Predator-­‐B	   20	  hrs.	   74-­‐324	   31k	  T	  MSL	   Radiator	  Grid	  Paaern	  
Tac'cal	  Fire	  Monitoring	  
	  
Shadow-­‐B	   1-­‐1.5	  hrs.	   varies	   varies	   Circular	  Loitering	  Orbit	  
Flood	  Inunda'on	  Mapping	  
	  
Aerosonde	   1-­‐4	  hrs.	   varies	   4k	  T	  AGL	   Radiator	  Grid	  Paaern	  
Point	  to	  Point	  
Flow	  Stream	  Monitoring	  	  
	  
Aerosonde	   1-­‐4	  hrs.	   20-­‐200	   4k	  	   Radiator	  Grid	  Paaern	  
Point	  to	  Point	  
VFR	  Traﬃc	  (courtesy	  of	  84th	  RADES)	  
•  The	  84th	  Radar	  EvaluaAon	  Squadron	  (RADES)	  data	  were	  used.	  
–  The	  data	  contain	  the	  radar	  hits	  collected	  from	  hundreds	  of	  radar	  sites	  in	  U.S,	  and	  each	  
hit	  provide	  Amestamp,	  laAtude,	  longitude	  and	  others	  but	  does	  not	  always	  provide	  
Mode	  3	  code,	  Mode	  C	  code.	  
–  All	  cooperaAve	  VFR	  has	  the	  same	  Mode	  3	  code,	  1200.	  
–  Extracted	  and	  generated	  naAon-­‐wide	  VFR	  ﬂight	  paths	  that	  VFR	  aircraT	  actually	  ﬂown	  
from	  the	  historical	  Air	  Defense	  84th	  Radar	  EvaluaAon	  Squadron	  (RADES)	  radar	  data	  
•  CooperaAve	  VFR	  tracks	  were	  processed	  using	  
–  A	  clustering	  method	  based	  on	  a	  modiﬁed	  minimum	  spanning	  tree	  algorithm,	  
–  The	  quadraAc	  regression	  to	  esAmate	  the	  aircraT	  posiAon	  within	  a	  Ame	  window,	  
–  A	  Kalman	  ﬁlter	  to	  generate	  smooth	  trajectories,	  
–  Filters	  to	  categorize	  each	  track	  into	  IFR	  or	  VFR:	  alAtude,	  speed,	  and	  Mode	  3	  code.	  
•  Non-­‐cooperaAve	  VFR	  tracks	  were	  processed	  
–  Using	  algorithm	  developed	  by	  Honeywell	  to	  process	  non-­‐cooperaAve	  VFR	  tracks	  and	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new	  path	  	  
with	  maneuver	  
A	  StochasAc	  Pilot	  Response	  Model	  
•  Pilot	  total	  response	  Ame	  is	  the	  Ame	  from	  the	  ﬁrst	  self-­‐separaAon	  alert	  to	  the	  
Ame	  pilot	  uploads	  maneuver	  to	  prevent	  loss	  of	  well	  clear.	  
–  NASA	  HSI	  team	  breaks	  this	  down	  by	  diﬀerent	  measures	  
•  Use	  total	  pilot	  response	  Ame	  data	  from	  HITL	  to	  build	  a	  pilot	  response	  Ame	  
model,	  so	  there	  are	  realisAc	  responses	  to	  SS	  alerts	  in	  ACES	  simulaAons	  
–  Sample	  from	  a	  distribuAon,	  and	  “wait”	  that	  amount	  of	  Ame	  before	  commanding	  
maneuver	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Distributions fit to 
IHITL Results 
	  Perceive	  a	  new	  Self	  
SeparaAon	  Alert	  
	  Evaluate	  Remaining	  







Preliminary	  Simula'on	  Results	  of	  On-­‐going	  UAS	  
DAA	  Study	  Using	  ACES	  Simula'on	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Accomplished	  ACES	  Fast-­‐Time	  SimulaAon	  Studies	  
•  DAA	  Surveillance	  Performance	  Study	  
–  To	  evaluate	  the	  performance	  of	  a	  surveillance	  system	  with	  diﬀerent	  
parameters,	  such	  as	  the	  raAo	  of	  undetected	  and	  late-­‐detected	  LoWC,	  and	  
the	  Ame	  to	  LoWC	  at	  ﬁrst	  detecAon	  for	  given	  surveillance	  parameters	  
•  Well	  Clear	  DeﬁniAon	  SimulaAon	  Study	  
–  To	  evaluate	  the	  eﬀect	  of	  diﬀerent	  Well	  Clear	  deﬁniAons	  on	  LoWC	  rates	  by	  
measuring	  the	  LoWC	  rates	  per	  UAS	  ﬂight	  hour	  
	  
•  Airspace	  Safety	  Threshold	  Study	  
–  To	  evaluate	  the	  safety	  of	  current	  airspace	  based	  on	  encounter	  rates	  of	  
simulated	  UAS	  missions	  with	  historical	  IFR	  and	  VFR	  ﬂight	  tracks	  
*	  All	  accomplished	  studies	  were	  unmiAgated	  studies	  in	  which	  no	  UAS	  or	  VFR	  ﬂights	  were	  
maneuvered	  to	  avoid	  potenAal	  Loss	  of	  Well	  Clear.	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On-­‐going	  UAS	  DAA	  SimulaAon	  Study	  
•  DAA	  Alert	  and	  ResoluAon	  Performance	  Study	  
–  To	  invesAgate	  encounter	  characterisAcs	  at	  alerts	  and	  at	  LoWC	  (e.g.	  range,	  
relaAve	  speed,	  relaAve	  heading,	  and	  verAcal	  closure	  rate)	  
–  To	  invesAgate	  the	  eﬀects	  of	  diﬀerent	  SST	  sevngs	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  DSS	  
SS	  system	  by	  measuring	  metrics	  such	  as	  correct/nuisance/late/missed	  alerts,	  
Ame	  to	  LoWC	  at	  ﬁrst	  alerts,	  alerAng	  duraAon,	  and	  resoluAon	  success	  rates	  
–  To	  derive	  required	  surveillance	  volumes	  to	  detect	  all/some	  intruders	  and	  
threats	  as	  a	  funcAon	  of	  diﬀerent	  SST	  sevngs	  with/without	  execuAon	  delays	  
•  Surveillance	  volume	  in	  terms	  of	  surveillance	  detecAon	  range,	  horizontal	  ﬁeld	  of	  
regard,	  and	  verAcal	  ﬁeld	  of	  regard	  
–  To	  invesAgate	  the	  eﬀects	  of	  realisAc	  sensor	  models	  with	  uncertainty	  (Range,	  




Sample	  Results:	  Loss	  of	  Well	  Clear	  on	  CONUS	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•  SimulaAng	  UAS	  missions	  without	  DAA	  system	  and	  ATC	  separaAon	  
provision	  services	  on	  cooperaAve	  VFR	  traﬃc	  on	  April	  4,	  2012,	  
–  2,664	  Loss	  of	  Well	  Clears.	  
–  LoWCs	  occurred	  mostly	  in	  the	  regions	  that	  have	  high	  VFR	  density.	  
Encounter	  CharacterisAcs	  of	  Intruders	  at	  LoWC	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CDF	  for	  Actual	  Time	  to	  LoWC	  from	  Alerts	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•  ACES	  is	  used	  to	  simulate	  NAS-­‐wide	  operaAons	  of	  UAS	  and	  VFR	  ﬂights	  
–  UAS	  missions	  and	  background	  VFR	  traﬃc	  
–  DAA	  alerAng	  and	  resoluAon	  algorithms	  
–  StochasAc	  pilot	  response	  model	  
•  Fast-­‐Ame	  simulaAon	  studies	  have	  been	  accomplished	  
–  Airborne	  encounter	  characterisAcs,	  alerAng	  performance,	  and	  airspace	  safety	  
have	  been	  invesAgated	  	  
–  The	  simulaAon	  results	  	  were	  provided	  to	  RTCA	  SC-­‐228	  for	  developing	  
minimum	  operaAonal	  performance	  standard	  (MOPS)	  for	  DAA	  systems	  
•  Keep	  working	  on	  improving	  ACES	  simulaAon	  ﬁdelity	  and	  capabiliAes	  to	  
simulate	  more	  realisAcally	  and	  invesAgate	  the	  impact	  of	  UAS	  
integraAon	  into	  the	  NAS	  on	  the	  safety	  and	  performance	  of	  the	  NAS.	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PotenAal	  Research	  Area	  
•  High-­‐ﬁdelity	  Surveillance	  Sensor	  Models	  with	  Uncertainty	  
–  Tracking	  Algorithms	  
•  AlerAng	  and	  ResoluAon	  Algorithms	  
–  Trajectory	  PredicAon	  Algorithms	  
–  AlerAng	  Logics	  and	  criteria	  
–  Avoidance	  algorithms	  	  
–  Performance	  evaluaAon	  methodology	  and	  metrics	  
	  
•  Interoperability	  with	  TCAS	  II	  System	  of	  Manned	  AircraT	  and	  with	  
Advanced	  NextGen	  SeparaAon	  Assurance	  systems	  
•  Decision	  Support	  Systems	  and	  Displays	  for	  UAS	  Pilot	  
–  To	  help	  UAS	  pilot	  to	  make	  a	  beaer	  decision	  on	  avoidance	  maneuver	  
–  ComputaAonal	  agent	  models	  for	  UAS	  pilot	  
•  Assessment	  of	  Diﬀerent	  FuncAonal	  AllocaAons	  
–  Controller/Pilot-­‐provided	  aircraT	  separaAon	  
–  Autonomous	  airborne	  self-­‐separaAon	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